Digital security is like most things – there’s no one-size-fits-all
solution to making yourself safe. The threats change depending on the
story you’re working on, where you’re working and who you’re working
with. To make it easier to determine your security needs, you need to
ask yourself some questions about what your specific threats actually
are. In other words, you need to do a threat model.
Jonathan Stray, a
professor at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism,
regularly teaches threat modeling to journalists and activists. The
journalist and computer scientist talked to DW Akademie about the
importance of threat models and what to consider when designing one. He
provides a concrete example to give a better idea of how they work.
Why is threat modeling important?
A lot of people assume that security comes from a tool or setting up
their computer a particular way. But that’s not where security comes
from. Security comes from having an understanding of the threats you
face as a journalist or an activist and having a plan to counter those
threats. So to ask if something is secure is not really a sensible
question. You can only ask if something is secure relative to a
particular threat.
And this is where threat modeling comes in?
If you are asking questions about security, then presumably there is
something you are worried about. A threat model is a way of writing down
your assumptions about what could happen. There are four basic
questions you need to ask in a threat model:
What do I want to protect? Normally, there is
some sort of information you want to keep secret. That could be what
you’re talking about with your sources, it could be the identity of the
sources themselves or it could be that you are working on a story or
that you are even in the country.
Who is trying to do something that I don’t want? In
security language, this is the adversary. The adversary could be the
subject of the story if you are researching criminal activity, it could
be the authorities in one form or another, or it could even be a
competing newsroom. You have to know who it is.
What can the adversary do? If your adversary
is the local authorities, how can they get the thing you don’t want them
to have? Can they monitor your communications? Can they steal your
laptop? Can they walk into your office and use your computer during your
lunch break? Can they arrest you and force you to give up a password?
Can they stop you at the border and search your camera? It’s a question
of their capabilities and that’s different depending on who the
adversaries are.
What happens if the adversary wins? In other
words, what is the risk? Does it mean you can’t publish the story? Does
it mean someone goes to jail? Are you going to get someone fired? Are
you going to ruin someone’s career? Or if you are working in conflict
zones, are you going to get someone killed? It’s really important to
understand what the risk is. Because an analysis of the risk is going to
tell you how careful and how paranoid you have to be and whether you
can do it at all.
You teach threat modeling to journalists at your university
and give them different scenarios to write a security plan for. Let’s
take look at one of them about a photojournalist in Syria who has
digital images to get out of the country.
In this scenario, I was interested in how the AP or BBC got their
images out of Syria. So you ask yourself the four questions again.
Who is the threat? It is the Syrian government or Syrian security forces in some form or another. So it is a pretty serious threat.
What do you have to protect? In this scenario,
you have to protect the identity of your sources. You are talking to
rebel fighters or anti-government forces and you don’t want the
government to know who they are. And because they are talking to a
foreign journalist they are even more at risk. So what it comes down to
is you can’t let them see your images and you can’t let them get your
address book. You don’t want them to track your movements either.
What can the adversary do? You are going to
have to leave the country at some point. You have to assume you are
going to get stopped at the border and all your gear is going to get
searched and all your memory cards and hard drives are potentially going
to be taken away from you and copied. So you have to assume that all
your data is going to be seen when you leave the country. They may also
be tracking your movements through your phone. This means if you are
meeting with sources, you probably shouldn’t be carrying your phone.
Your sources are going to have phones too, so all the authorities have
to do is see who you met with more than once. Who else came in close
proximity?
What is the risk? In this case, it is maximum
risk – your sources are going to be arrested and tortured or killed. So
it is a pretty serious scenario.
What do you do once you’ve done your threat model?
In this case, it means you have narrowed down your needs to how can
you get the photos out without having them copied at the border. Then
you can start thinking about tools, such as encryption and VPNs to get
the data out (VPNs = Virtual Private Networks, which are used for secure
connections. See our post on VPNs to
understand more on what they are and how to use them). It would be best
if you weren’t carrying anything when you crossed the border at all. So
one solution is to set up a VPN or another kind of secure connection
and upload the material before you try to leave. There are various
possible solutions but you can’t see the solutions until you have asked
yourself the questions.
And the journalists who decide to leave with the material on
them, isn’t one of the problems with encryption that you can just be
tortured until you give up the password?
There is a phrase in security work called “rubber hose
cryptanalysis.” This means if someone wants to break the encryption on
some data, they can beat you with a rubber hose until you tell them the
password. In this specific case, there is a well-known trick which might
work, which is to not know the password. You have the computer generate
a big random password, you encrypt the material and you send the
password out of the country to an employer or a trusted friend. That is
obviously something you have to plan for. Assuming you have a secure
internet connection or phone channel, you send it out and then you lose
it so when you walk across the border you don’t have the password. It
isn’t the best solution because it’s a question of whether they believe
you. They can still detain you arbitrarily, but at least your material
won’t fall into their hands, and at least you can keep your promise to
your source.
(There is a case where a British filmmaker’s materials fell into the hands of the Syrian authorities, read about it here)
So you might get beaten up, but at least your source won’t get killed.
This is key in journalism and journalism ethics.
There are basically two kinds of risk – risk to you and risk to your
sources. You are allowed to choose to take personal risks but you are
not allowed to choose to create risk for your sources without their
consent and understanding. This is a major difference that has to go
into your planning.
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